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ABSTRACT 
Conceptual architectures provide a means for architecting complex network 
centric systems. This approach provides the basis for security architecture for a network 
enabled capability. Security assessments and security architectures are of utmost 
importance in any system development to ensure that systems are properly protected from 
both unauthorized access and or malicious applications, especially for network enabled 
systems as societies’ use of such system approaches an all time high. Therefore a need for 
a structured approach in designing such systems is necessary and has been recognized. Of 
particular importance is a methodology that cuts across a wide variety of security tasks 
and needs. By assessing the challenges, relevance and requirements a security 
architecture methodology is put forward to take care of the security needs of a complex 
network centric system. This thesis describes an over-arching security architecture 
methodology for large network enabled systems that can be scaled down for smaller 
network centric operations such as present at the University of Missouri-Rolla. By 
leveraging the five elements of security policy & standards, security risk management, 
security auditing, security federation and security management, of the proposed security 
architecture and addressing the specific needs of UMR, the methodology was used to 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
In describing a security architecture methodology, several relevant concepts 
emerge. These concepts include trust, policy and standards, services, risk management 
and so on. Also, these concepts in themselves have enormous application and span a 
broad spectrum, across various disciplines. 
However, in this thesis, these concepts are defined or represented in the context of 
security in information technology networks, which is the bed rock of net-centricity. 
Furthermore, net-centricity or network-enabled capability (NEC) which society 
have come to depend on is built on strong architecture; unfortunately it is designed with 
the intention of being open. This places the responsibility of securing the networks and 
information to the individual users or organizations, ergo the need to develop a security 
architecture framework or methodology that can easily be adapted and scaled for various 
systems. 
The recent progress achieved in information technology has increased the 
connectivity within societies, governments, industries and individuals. This has largely 
been made possible through internet and broadband communication technology 
advances; which in turn have created systems that are very different from past systems. 
Network-centric is the term used to describe such systems. These systems comprise a 
diverse category of large and complex systems whose purpose is providing network-type 
services. Network-centric systems are also frequently collaborative systems that are built 
on partially voluntary and uncontrolled interaction of complex elements in an ad hoc 
environment [1]. 
A security architecture methodology is needed as systems become more complex 
and multi-disciplinary. Network-centric systems are complex not just because of the 
number of subsystems and components present, but also because of real time data 
components required and the diversity involved. Some examples of network centric 
systems are the military systems, banking system and the educational systems. All these 
systems and their respective industries have come to rely heavily on information 
technology and the net-centricity it affords. This further emphasizes the critical need for 
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security architecture for these systems and invariably a security architecture 
methodology. 
Therefore, there are challenges in prescribing an architectural methodology for 
the security of such a system, which will accommodate the subsystems complexity and 
real-time data distribution capabilities as well as the diversity associated with them. In 
order to avoid system degradation resulting from failure to handle large amounts of real-
time data distribution, complexities in net-centric systems need to be addressed.  
 
1.1. MOTIVATION   
Going through several papers searching for information in security architecture, it 
became apparent that there was no paper addressing security architecture methodology, 
especially a step by step application for a network-enabled capability. Therefore, this 
thesis aims to put forward a methodology that can be applied for both large and small net-
centric systems. 
A security architecture methodology should include physical protection, network 
security, message-level security and application-level security. In addition, should 
include security in the form of authorization, privacy, policy, trust, and secure 
conversation. Lastly the methodology should accommodate a federation of systems. 
1.1.1. Goals of Security Architecture Methodology.  At the beginning of this 
thesis, the following goals for a security architecture development methodology were 
established in order to set a clear focus for the paper. 
(1) The methodology should efficiently and effectively facilitate the development 
of an integrated security architectures and plans for enterprise networks. 
(2) The methodology should facilitate an integrated solution across very complex 
heterogeneous information systems. 
(3) The methodology must result in a final product that covers all customers’ 
requirements, policies and guidelines. 
(4) The methodology must provide the customer with visibility into the process as 
well as the solutions. 
(5) The methodology needs to facilitate incorporation of changes due to advances 
in technology and revisions of policies and guidelines. 
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1.1.2. Relevance of Security Architecture to NEC.  In order to have a 
perspective of what the task process will entail, an attempt is made to discuss some of the 
reasons security architecture is necessary for a network-enabled capability (NEC) under 
the following high- level groupings. 
Information Sharing 
Information sharing is fundamental for success in both every day lives and 
business ventures; however it is important that the information that is sent be secured, 
that is, the information be retrieved and viewed by only the intended parties. 
Security architecture therefore supports information sharing by assuring users that 
their communications will be private. Security architecture establishes a common 
language for security. It provides structure which can facilitate learning and 
understanding of the complexities of the security requirements and solutions and their 
interactions with the rest of the system. It provides the industry a coherent way of how 
elements of the security solution must fit into the overall. 
Interoperability 
Net-centricity systems suppose a federation, a no single owner situation and 
interoperability of all these systems is required to make it work. Security architecture 
provides a coherent technical approach to security across any organization that would 
enable secure interoperability. It would enable the representation at any time the best 
knowledge on technical security solutions.  
It would help present security problems and solution as an easily assessable and 
identifiable process which could be described at different levels of detail i.e. from high 
level to lower levels of implementation. 
It would show some progress in prototyping scenario which can be validated by 
implementing any part of a security architecture using the methodology provided 
Uninterrupted Operations 
Services and businesses that have come to depend on net-centricity work most 
exceptionally because of their uninterrupted operations. This has come to mean that the 
infrastructures that run on a net-centric environment are critical and needs a security 
measure to protect it. Security architecture therefore provides a guideline for the 
protection of all these critical infrastructures. 
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Security Risk Management 
Security architecture would provide a coordinated security risk management that 
would provide guidelines for decision making and, as a result, would optimize the 
investment in security resources. 
A security risk management process would provide a tool which will help in the 
implementation of the chosen risk analysis methodology.  The input will be continuously 
changing threat, vulnerability and impact (or asset value) information and the output will 
show the requirements for security countermeasures of all types (e.g. physical, personnel, 
procedural and technical) to maintain risk at acceptable levels. 
It would provide for an informed risk management decisions to be made by 
allowing accreditors to identify all the security implications caused by a change to any 
element of the infrastructure. 
It would help in identifying security risks for a NEC for which countermeasures 
might need optimizing or are yet to exist.  
From the above potential beneficiaries can be derived such as stakeholders, 
security risk owners, capability managers, accreditors, system managers, security 
(including cyberdefence) managers, researchers and developers, system designers, 
security product designers, product vendors and even end-users who will use and benefit 
from the security architecture. 
 
1.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Some challenges that would be encountered in the design of security architecture 
and its methodology for a large net-centric system are put forward in this section. 
1.2.1. Challenges of Prescribing Security Architecture for NEC.  In 
prescribing security architecture for a NEC, challenges are faced. Some of the challenges 
are unique to information technology/NEC while the others are general. Some possible 
requirement for security architecture have been listed above, possible challenges that 
might be encountered are mentioned subsequently.  
Firewall Limitations: – It is of import to know the limitations of firewall which 
may not detect potential attacks. Examples are attacks that are disguised to cause internal 
application buffer overflow. New firewall products designed to protect Web Services at 
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the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) level are in the market now, however it has 
yet to be determined how effective they are and also their position within the security 
architecture is not yet clear.   
Service-Level Security Semantics: – Definitions and standardizations are yet to 
permeate the fabric of security. The standards for the mechanism by which different 
parties interface with each other to achieve security goals such as authentication and 
authorization are yet to be defined and prescribed.  
Interoperability of Security Solutions: –The lack of standard at the service 
interface level, has made it impossible for security products currently in the market 
currently to be fully interoperable.  
Security vs. Performance: – The use of public key (PK) encryption in security 
architecture requires computation intensive tasks that include message signing, 
encryption, and certificate validation. In this instance sending a secure message will be 
several times much slower than a less secure version, and a direct inverse relationship 
between performance and security can be computed. Therefore cautious planning and 
effective optimization techniques are necessary to meet operational requirements.  
Impacts on Existing Policies and Processes: – In addition to the identification of 
system boundaries, trust relationships need to be established for a more dynamic 
application in a net-centric environment. This will require the establishment of trust 
domain relationships. 
1.2.2. Other Challenges.  In addition to the above, the challenges below need to 
be considered, especially keeping in mind that security needs to be dynamic since it has 
become increasingly clear that the term “security” means nothing unless[2] it is possible 
to know who needs to keep out and for how long  they need to be kept out. 
The idea of a security architecture methodology for net-centric system not only 
implies the governance and maintenance of the architecture but that dynamic security 
policies and policy based access control be incorporated into the architecture and 
methodology e upgrades. This will furthermore entail more challenge in achieving an 
architecture which is sufficiently adaptable in its implementation of the risk management 
methodology and accommodate future uncertainties.  If the security risk management 
processes are modeled incorrectly in the higher levels of the architecture, the problems 
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will be cascaded to lower levels. In this thesis an attack tree model is used to demonstrate 
the importance of risk management. 
It is also important to note that a user-friendly architecture will be of concern 
since the architecture will be used by a wide variety of people most of whom may not be 
versed in all the technical details. 
 A security architecture for net-centric system will need to be achieved using a 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) with “ubiquitous security services” being applied at 
all OSI layers [3]. Melrose and Madahar [4] uses an OSI/ISO layer type architecture to 
describe an overarching security architecture for NATO NEC which can be incorporated 
in this methodology description. 
 
1.3. SECTION ORGANIZATION 
In here describes the structure for the rest of this thesis. Section 2 is the literature 
review. It presents a brief summary of security architectures of the Department of 
Defense Information System and the NATO, the standards and heuristics tool that help in 
systems architecting, and document of the Joint Technical Architecture- a DoD document 
that specifies technical standards for interoperability. It also discusses research in 
complexity theory, architecture overview- by presenting the different types of 
architecture, security architecture and security architecture, architecture frameworks and 
network enabled capability. 
Section 3 discusses the methodology of a security architecture -by looking at the 
requirements, critical success factors for a security architecture methodology, and delves 
in details on the actual methodology. 
Section 4 presents an example of security architecture for net-centric system using 
the University of Missouri-Rolla by adopting the methodology already prescribed in 
section.  Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions and future work. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In recent times, all systems are distributed to some degree. They include[5] 
communication system allocating channels through distributed switches, aircraft flown 
using distributed controls, computer memories built out of hundreds of thousands of 
distributed active elements, banking systems and credit card services operating at 
different locations serving customer several million miles away, military operations 
relying on distributed elements, all operating in whole or part through network enabled 
capability. Unfortunately, as societies have come to rely heavily on information 
technology and the advances it affords by way of net-centricity, it becomes increasingly 
important that net centric systems such as these systems mentioned should have security 
architecture in place to help in the countering of unauthorized access to systems. 
Hence, the criticality and the urgency of security architecture, ergo a methodology 
for such distributed/net-centric system cannot be over emphasized. It goes without saying 
that because of societies reliance on these system, an outage due to an attack will be 
costly, both in monetary  terms and otherwise.  
Even though societies have achieved stupendous technological advances, 
infrastructures are still prone to security flaws ever more so now, than in previous 
technologies. The difference between previous security measures and current security 
architecture for NEC is that, it has become much easier to crack security because of 
technology. For instance a safe that recognizes and stores the index finger to unlock it is 
much easier to crack because if the finger impression is not wiped, using any other mould 
to make the impression will unlock the safe.  
Applications for this thesis extends from civilian operations such as in the energy 
sector (pipeline monitoring of petroleum products), telecommunications sector (secure 
communication for customers), to military operations.  
There was little information in literatures regarding security architecture 
methodology for large scale net-centric systems; however various literatures on security, 
security architecture, net-centric system, complexity and more were reviewed; from 
which information has been gathered on what security architecture should consist of. A 
step by step method of prescribing this security architecture is therefore needed to 
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provide both architecture designers and implementors alike a guide of how and what is 
necessary to build security architecture successfully in systems that are network enabled.  
 It is important to note that network enabled capability and network centric/net-
centric are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to activities across and within a 
network of participants in a continuously-evolving, complex community of people, 
devices, information and services interconnected by a communications network to 
achieve optimal benefit of resources and better synchronization of events and their 
consequences. This entails allowing a wide range of people including entities that are 
known and are trusted as well as strangers, access to networks which might be misused in 
a manner that threatens the network. Furthermore, the challenges mentioned previously 
are compounded by the fact that complexities   existing in net-centric systems need to be 
address due to real time data demand and distribution especially in military operations, 
therefore the discussion and understanding of complexity theory.  
Complexity can be described as the degree of difficulty to understand, verify and 
formulate system behavior; even when knowing information about the components, their 
numbers, arrangements, functional properties and interactions. Edmonds [6] writes that 
complexity is that property of a language expression which makes it difficult to formulate 
its overall behavior even when given almost complete information about its atomic 
components and their inter-relations. Complexity can also be defined as a measure of 
uncertainty in achieving a set of specific functions or functional requirements [7]. This 
leads to the concept of securing a complex network of people using the information 
technology infrastructure. 
 
2.1. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW 
The DoD Goal Security Architecture (DGSA) [8] [9] defines four types of 
architecture. DGSA was developed as part of the technical Architecture Framework for 







Abstract Architecture  
The abstract architecture defines principles and fundamental concepts that guide 
the selection and organization of functions. This level of architecture cites principles, 
fundamental concepts and functions that satisfy the typical security requirements. 
Generic Architecture  
The generic architecture defines the general types of components and allowable 
standards to be used and identifies any necessary guidelines for their application. 
Logical Architecture  
This is a design that meets a hypothetical set of requirements. It serves as a 
detailed example that illustrates the results of applying a generic architecture to specific 
circumstances. 
Specific Architecture  
The specific architecture addresses components, interfaces, standards, 
performance and cost. Specific architectures show how all the selected information 
security components and mechanisms combine to meet the security requirements of the 
systems under consideration. 
Other architecture typologies exist, such as Figure 2.1 depicted over leaf. 
Conceptually this is the kind of typology used in this thesis.  
The term “architecture” is used extensively in several fields of study and in 
diverse context, but generally refers to a conceptual, abstract or real, design or plan that 
describes the system, including the constituent parts and the relationships between them, 
its structure, organization, policies and standards. [4]  
Architecture is the art of designing the human built environment. It is an 
interdisciplinary field, which draws on mathematics, science, art, technology, social 
sciences, politics, history, and philosophy [10]. “Architecture is a science, arising out of 
many other sciences, and adorned with much and varied learning: by the help of which a 
judgment is formed of those works which are the result of other arts.” (Marcus V. Pollio, 
died ca. 25 BC). 
The diverse context of the term architecture ranges from the familiar use in the 
building sector to use in biology (e.g. to describe the architecture of the human anatomy 
composed of organs, the nervous systems and the circulatory systems), to use in 
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enterprise (e.g. architecture regarding the business structures, constituent processes and 
workflows) [8]. Architectures, which can be represented by diverse variety of 




Functional Context Structural 






Figure 2.1: Typologies of Architecture 
 
 
2.1.1. Systems Architecture.  A system is any group of interdependent or 
temporally interacting parts or subsystems that come together to provide a service. 
Usually the parts or subsystems are systems themselves that provide service on their own 
and are generally composed of other parts. This generally implies that a system can be 
many things or comprise of many parts. This leads us to systems thinking which is a 
technique that may be used to study any kind of system be it human, natural, scientific or 
conceptual. The systems approach is based on the tenet that “the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts” — Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC).  
Fundamentally systems are a collection of different things which together produce 
results unattainable by the elements alone. Even though it may appear that a system can 
magically work together (since the subsystems already perform independently), it is 
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important to note that they have to be designed or architected in order to maximize their 
efficiency. Therefore, systems architecting focuses on the systems as a whole, 
particularly when making value judgments of what is required and design decisions of 
what are feasible [12].  
Systems architecting is the art and science of developing systems solutions by 
using systems engineering specialties to develop satisfactory and feasible systems 
concepts and certification for client use in ill-structured problem environments [12].  
Systems architecting approach goes beyond mathematical analysis and 
optimization of systems. Systems architecting quickly and naturally abstracts and 
generalizes lessons learned elsewhere, not only for itself but for transfer and 
specialization in other branches. 
Systems architecting employs various tools among which are standards and 
heuristics. Heuristics are lessons learned, derived from experiences collated in several 
disciplines and over the years. Heuristics approach to security architecting is necessary 
because security is not static, but rather needs to evolve to keep up with changes.  
Systems architecting is also characterized by these four attributes of performance-
technical, aesthetic, sociopolitical, risk-uncertainty, complexity, management, cost-
people, money, time and schedule-sequencing, events, coordination. All these require 
delicate balancing in order to achieve an optimal architecture. 
2.1.2. Systems Architecting: the Context for Security Architecture.  For this 
thesis, it is important to bring together all the elements of security to provide a systems 
approach methodology to security architecture. As system complexity increases, systems 
architects are faced with the increasingly difficult task of assuring that the evolving form 
of the system meets client needs. For security architecture, the systems tools of heuristics 
and standards can be applied, while also applying the mathematical analysis needed to 
achieve an optimal architecture. 
Currently, security architecture requirements are largely specific to individual 
organizations; as a result a spread of definitions and understandings exists. In most, 
however, security architecture should provide a complete and consistent picture of 
security to allow for a step by step approach to managing security risks.   
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A security architecture should not only  consider the structure of the technical 
components but many other facet such as complexity especially when it involves net-
centric components , but it should also encompass the organizational and operational 
features such as the principles, policies, processes and their  integration and 
interrelationships within the overall system it functions and contributes.  This allows for 
an overarching business enterprise architecture, whether civil or military where 
consistency and compliancy is a requirement for success. Therefore Security Architecture 
[13] is an integral and critical component within the overall Enterprise Architecture 
designed specifically to:  
• Enable secure communications and the appropriate protection of information 
resources within corporate infrastructures. 
• Support legal information security requirements established by existing legislation 
pertaining to information confidentiality, accessibility, availability and integrity. 
• Support secure, efficient transaction of business and delivery of services. As well 
as leverage opportunities to obtain IT Security synergies with the business.  
2.1.3. Security Architecture for Net-centric Services Requirements.  Security 
architecture services should address user identification, authentication, authorization & 
access control, administration and audit. The Defense Information Systems Agency 
(DISA)   document [14] prescribes a security architecture for net-centric systems. The 
primary goal of the security architecture defined in this document is to ensure Enterprise 
Services (ES) can be invoked securely. As with every mission critical distributed system 
there is a set of key security requirements that must be met: 
 1. Authentication – Most (if not all) service providers will require that consumers 
are authenticated before accepting a service request. Service consumers will also need to 
authenticate service providers when a response is received. Different authentication 
mechanisms should be supported, and these mechanisms should be configurable and 
interchangeable according to service-specific requirements. 
 2. Authorization – In addition to authentication of a service consumer, access to a 
service will also require the consumer to possess certain privileges. These privileges feed 
an authorization check that is usually based on access control policies – who can access a 
service and under what conditions, for example.  Different models may be used for 
 
 13
authorization, such as mandatory or role based access control. The authorization 
implementation should also be extensible to allow for domain- or communities of interest 
(COI)-specific customizations. 
 3. Confidentiality – Protect the underlying communication transport as well as 
messages or documents that are carried over the transport so that they cannot be made 
available to unauthorized parties. Sometimes only a fragment of the message or 
document (e.g. wrapped within a certain XML tag) may need to be kept confidential. 
4. Data Integrity – Provide protection against unauthorized alteration of messages 
during transit. 
 5. Non-repudiation – Provide protection against false denial of involvement in a 
communication. Non-repudiation ensures that a sender cannot deny a message already 
sent, and a receiver cannot deny a message already received. This is especially important 
in monetary transactions and security auditing. 
 6. Manageability – The security architecture should also provide management 
capabilities for the above security functions. These may include, but are not limited to, 
credential management, user management, and access control policy management. 
 7. Accountability – This includes secure logging and auditing which is also 
required to support non-repudiation claims. 
In addition other requirements necessary for a Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) mentioned include security trust domain, interoperability, security policies and so 
on. 
 
2.2. STANDARDS AND HEURISTICS 
Heuristics means “to guide” or “to pilot”, making it an important tool in 
architecting since architecting is a form of piloting. Heuristics [12] are abstraction of 
experience accumulated with a remarkable characteristic of it being passed on and used 
in the future. It helps avoid the pit falls of yesteryears and reduces it’s time consuming 
process. The formats of heuristics are words expresses in natural languages.  
Heuristics provide non-analytical guidelines for treating complex, inherently 
unbounded, ill-structured problems. They are used as aids in decision making, value 
judgment and assessment. They are found throughout systems architecting, from earliest 
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conceptualization through diagnosis and operation. They provide the successive transition 
from qualitative, provisional needs to descriptive and prescriptive guidelines and, hence, 
to rational approaches and methods [12]. 
Heuristics helps in risk reduction as well as provides lessons to teach in the 
control of critical system features. 
An example of a heuristics that applies to security architecting methodology is 
“The greatest leverage in systems architecting is at the interface”. With this heuristics 
attention is focused on the elements of security architecture and a structured methodology 
is prescribed through it. 
Systems standards, another important tool set allows for system/ interface 
integration and interoperability. Examples of standards include the system specification, 
interface description and interface management. 
The Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) is a Department of Defense (DoD) 
document [15] that provides standards, guidelines and specification for interoperability in 
communications and weapon systems. These sets of commercial specifications are 
provided in the areas of information processing, information transfer, modeling, message 
format, user interface, and security that need to be applied to all new information 
technology and national security systems. 
In order to successfully overcome battlefield challenges, U.S. Forces will need to 
operate in a fast, flexible and agile manner. The necessary ingredient for this to happen is 
to provide quality information that can be shared without deterioration to enable sound 
individual and collective judgments.  
The key to achieving this is to ensure the timely reception of secure and accurate 
data to the intended party. The intended party could range from the foot soldier of US 
force or another unit of the armed forces to coalition forces of allied countries, including 
aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
 Achieving this information end-state will result in forces attaining Information 
Superiority over potential adversaries. The JTA document came to exist because of the 
need for interoperability between the various components involved in the ever changing 
battlefield, including remote logistical and support operations. 
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Interoperability is achieved when systems can provide and accept services from 
other systems and can operate effectively together. Interoperability is defined by DoD as 
“The condition achieved among communications electronics systems or items of 
communications electronics equipment when information and services can be exchanged 
directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability 
should be defined when referring to specific cases”  
JTA is intended as an open systems approach in designing weapons since it is not 
possible to determine beforehand all the systems and components that will be involved in 
any given battlefield. 
The technical standards espoused by the JTA document is aimed at military 
network enabled systems. Other network enabled systems such as the banking systems 
also can benefit from standards and probably have in place technical standards 
specification for interoperability of equipment. This provides some sort of security 
measure for the system since any equipment that connects to the system must have the 
technical standards prescribed, however this is not sufficient in offering a consistent 
protection to the system in the event of a breach in security. 
Both heuristics and standards are good tools in security architecture; however a 
methodology is also required. 
 
2.3. ARCHITECTURAL FRAMEWORKS 
The Open Group [16] is international consortium of vendor-neutral buyers and 
suppliers of technology. The main mission of this group is “to cause the development of a 
viable global information infrastructure that is ubiquitous, trusted, reliable, and easy –to-
use. The Open Group creates an environment where all elements involved in technology 
development can cooperate to deliver less costly and more flexible IT solutions”. 
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) evolved from the DoD’s 
Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management (TAFIM).The 
Architecture Forum of The Open Group whose key activities includes defining, 
integrating and evolving standards to support Open systems is charged with developing 
TOGAF since inception and has evolved continuously since the mid-90’s[16][17]. 
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TOGAF is an Enterprise Architecture framework which provides a 
comprehensive approach to the design, planning, implementation, and governance of 
enterprise information architecture. This architecture is typically modeled at four levels 
or domains; Business, Application, Data, Technology.  
Unlike the DoDAF [18], the architectural description dictates what products to 
assemble, further than the essential ones. Also TOGAF is iterative making it possible to 
rework processes until a better one is assured. This is typically what security architecture 
should be able to perform since it has been determined that security is dynamic. Figure 
2.2 show that the phases navigate iteratively in a cycle. The circles represent the major 
































Architectural frameworks also provide valuable tool for designing a security 
architecture methodology, particularly TOGAF provides for iteration which is an added 
value since security is dynamic and its methodology should also be dynamic to meet with 
security changes. 
 
2.4. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR NATO NEC 
Melrose & Madahar proposes a Layered Structure for an overarching security 
architecture. In Figure 2.3 shown below they propose a framework for developing an 
overarching NATO Networked Enabled Capability (NNEC) Architecture using a 
previously performed NNEC Feasibility Study [19].  The framework consists of five 
abstraction layers. The dashed line provides a notational view of Networking and 
Information Infrastructure (NII).  A NII reference architecture has been generated and 
includes consideration of Information Assurance (IA) elements but at the technical level.  
There is no dedicated security view within the architecture, or consideration of a business 
driven top-down approach, which would satisfy some of the reasons security architecture 
is necessary for Network Enabled Capability (NEC) mentioned previously {site 
Introduction Relevance}.  With a focus just on NII, there is a risk that the security aspects 
of the architecture will be fragmented and not provide the required coherent enterprise-
wide picture. 
Even though the focus has largely been on logical security of data, physical 
security of equipment and infrastructures should not be overlooked. For the most part 
satellite and other resources such as copper wire and submarine cables has been the 
conduit for most of the network activities, albeit these resources are sometimes not 
located in close proximity for supervision rendering it a possible target for mischievous 
attackers. A very recent example can be seen in the destruction of an old satellite by the 
Chinese, reminding us all that physical security for these resources will need to be 
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Figure 2.3: Framework for Development of an Overarching NNEC Architecture    
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3.1. METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
The methodology used in this thesis was to first describe in detail the different 
concept requirements of what security architecture should consist. By following the listed 
approach a methodology is developed, which is then applied in describing security 
architecture for small scale net-centric operation of the University of Missouri-Rolla. 
3.1.1. Security Architecture Development.  In systems engineering, security 
architecture means much more. Before delving into security architecture development, 
there is a need to throw more light on the term “interoperability” since several 
connotations can be drawn from different fields. Interoperability is the connecting of 
people, data and diverse systems. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) defines interoperability as the ability of two or more systems or components to 
exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged [20]. 
According to International Organization for Standardization and the International 
Electrotechnical Commission ISO/IEC 2382-01, interoperability is defined as follows: 
“The capability to communicate, execute programs, or transfer data among various 
functional units in a manner that requires the user to have little or no knowledge of the 
unique characteristics of those units”[21]. 
 Therefore, interoperability describes the capability of different programs, 
systems, units to exchange data, information or services through common sets of 
procedures in order to provide services. Interoperability strongly implies that the product 
or system be designed with standardization in mind. 
Now because of all these connections going on, there is need to have an 
architecture framework that caters for security.  Security architecture in this context 
embodies several concepts among which are: 
(1) Providing both coherent and interoperability approach to security problem and 
solution. 
(2) Describing the relationships between different parts of security solution. 




Security architecture as a subset of architecture, specifically addresses elements 
relevant to security-relevant issues. The security architecture is a strategic framework that 
allows the alignment of an organizations development and operations effort. It is a 
unifying framework that allows reusability of services that implement policy, standards, 
and risk management decisions. In addition the security architecture allows for 
improvements which may not be possible to make at a project level.  At the architecture 
level for instance, an architect can prospectively recognize the need to leverage a reusable 
service for several projects instead for only a particular project, thereby saving cost in the 
long run.  
In summary, security architecture provides the framework and foundation to 
enable secure communication, protect organization business processes and information 
resources, and ensures that new methods for delivering service are secure. 
3.1.2. Security Architecture Methodology.  The words “method” and 
“methodology” indicate “a particular course of action.” Literally methodology entails 
“the study of method”. Methods impress order. Actually the idea of using method in a 
chaotic world is to glean the benefits of order it impresses [22].  
The dictionary defines methodology as “a particular procedure or set of 
procedures”. Checkland [23] writes “I take a methodology to be intermediate in status 
between a philosophy…and a technique or method. A philosophy… might be…’political 
action should aim at a redistribution of wealth in society,’…At the other extreme a 
technique is a precise specific programme of action which will produce a desired result: if 
you learn the appropriate technique and execute it adequately you can, with certainty, 
solve a pair of simultaneous equations…A methodology will lack the precision of a 
technique but will be a firmer guide to action than a philosophy. Where a technique tells 
you ’how’ and a philosophy tells you ’what,’ a methodology will contain elements of 
both ‘what’ and ‘how’”.  
A methodology is defined as a codified set of practices, sometimes accompanied 
by training materials, formal educational programs, worksheets, and diagramming tools 
that can be carried out repeatedly to replicate a product or procedure. It can also be 
defined as an organized, documented set of procedures and guidelines for one or more 
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phases of the life cycle, such as analysis or design. Methodology usually includes 
methods, procedures, and techniques involved in analyzing information.  
A security architecture methodology therefore refers to sets of practices for 
performing or defining security architecture in a coherent, consistent, accountable and 
repeatable manner. It presents a package of practical ideas, principles, procedures and 
proven practices that can be applied in the planning, design and development of security 





Figure 3.1: Architecture Development Methodology. Adapted from [9] 
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management, security policy, risk management, security architecture and others. All these 
are elaborated subsequently. 
3.1.3. Security Architecture Methodology Requirement.  In designing any 
system methodology, some key requirements need to be met. Several methods of 
performing a requirements analysis for systems are available. However, each method has 
its strengths and weaknesses; therefore a combination of several methods was used in this 
requirements gathering to provide not only a broad range of usefulness, but represent 
different approaches to the problem of gathering requirements. Critical Success Factor 
(CSF) Analysis method and Usage Scenarios are the methods mostly used in this 
analysis. 
3.1.4. Critical Success Factors Analysis.  The concept of identifying and 
applying Critical Success Factors (CSFs) dates back to the original notion of “success 
factors” in D. Ronald Daniel’s [24] “Management Information Crisis”.  Critical Success 
Factor (CSF) as it is known today was expanded by John F. Rockhart [25], of MIT’s 
Sloan School of Management, from Daniel’s work to specifically filter and identify the 
information in the making of critical enterprise decisions. 
In “A Primer on Critical Success Factors,” [26] Rockhart codified the ideology of 
success factors as a way to systematically identify the information needs of executives. It 
clearly specifies the essential steps of gathering and investigating data for the formation 
of a set of organizational CSFs that can be used by executives to aid in organizational 
administration. This document is generally thought to be the first account of the CSF 
method. 
Even though both Rockhart and Daniel focused on refining the information needs 
of executives, Rockhart equally hinted at the value of the method as a component for the 
strategic planning of information systems or technology. Therefore CSF method has been 
used in many areas including in the technology planning methodologies in use today [27]. 
CSF used in this context is considered to be an essential component of a strategic 
plan that must be achieved in addition to the organization’s goals and objectives. It is 
important to make this subtle distinction because an organization’s CSFs should drive the 
accomplishment of its mission. 
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CSFs identify key performance areas that are crucial in order for an organization 
or process to achieve its mission. Administrators or overseers of a project should know 
and consider these key areas when they set goals, as they provide a common point of 
reference for the entire organization or process, when they direct operational activities 
and tasks that are important to achieving goals,. Thus, any activity or initiative that the 
organization undertakes must ensure consistently high performance in these key areas; 
otherwise, the organization may not be able to achieve its goals and consequently may 
fail to accomplish its mission [27]. Therefore a good security architecture methodology 
should outline key performance areas that should support strong security architecture. 
Traditionally, strategic planning and managements’ definition of a goal or an 
objective is moderately well known; conversely, characterizing CSF is not particularly 
clear. Hence, CSFs are often confused with organizational goals. In this paper 
organizational goals are defined as targets that are established to achieve the 
organization’s mission. They are very specific as to what must be achieved, when it is to 
be achieved, and by whom. Effective goals have a quantitative element that is measurable 
to determine if the goal has been achieved. Goals can be decomposed into operational 
activities to be performed throughout the organization. 
CFS can be defined in many ways, these points to the elusive nature of CFS.  The 
Critical Success Factors analysis methodology is a top-down approach for determining 
requirements based on the needs of the organization. The top-down approach makes CSF 
a perfect tool, well-suited for determining requirements analysis for large systems with 
many stakeholders and audiences with various interests and at times conflicting. CSFs are 
those key or important things that need to be realized in order to achieve the goals. A 
CSF for an organization or process in general is usually related to more than one goal. 
Some of the merits of identifying CSFs are that;  
• They are simple to understand and help direct awareness to major concerns. 
• They are good method of communicating to workers, implementers and can be 
easy to monitor. 
• They can be used in concert with strategic planning methodologies. 
Identifying CSFs is extremely important because it keeps people focused and each 
CSF should be measurable and associated with a target goal because things that are 
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measured get done more often. Exact measures are not necessarily important, but they 
provide guidelines. 
The CSF analysis method starts off by determining the goal of the mission, 
commonly termed mission statement, and then goes on to separate high-level goals of the 
mission statement.  
The high-level goals are then decomposed into Critical Success Factors, which are 
then split into many levels of hierarchy, becoming more specific.  
At the lowest level, each CSF becomes a requirement for the system; a single, 
well-defined task that must be accomplished in order to be successful. Along the way, 
problems to be solved and assumptions made are recorded. 
Once the CSF hierarchy is established and a set of requirements has been derived, 
these can then be arranged into a matrix for comparison with the problems identified. In 
order to be considered complete, each problem must be fully addressed by one or more 
requirements. 
By analyzing the steps necessary to achieve success, and cross-referencing them 
against problems to be solved, a complete set of requirements can be determined that can 
then be correlated with specific user scenarios. Each of the requirements should apply to 
at least one user scenario, and, generally, more than one. 
This methodology allows requirements to be determined that satisfy the needs of 
the organization and those of the user. Since architectural frameworks are built and 
maintained by organizations, this method allows us to create a well-defined and 
reasonably complete set of requirements. 
 
3.2. THE ANALYSIS HIERARCHY 
3.2.1. Mission.  The mission of the Security Architecture methodology is to 
develop and maintain standard reference for designing and implementing any large scale 
network-centric system. 
It is important to note that the primary users of this document include 
stakeholders, therefore the need to map the system’s stakeholders’ conceptual goals to a 
logical view for security managers who need to make decisions on security, as well as 
other audiences such as the information technology community and other 
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managers/implementers who are developing security architectures for use as a reference 
architecture. 
3.2.2. Goals.  At the highest level, the goals of this security architecture 
methodology can be divided into 5 categories. Each of which is related to the CSFs and 
requirements which will be explained, where each of the top-level goal is further 
elaborated.  
It is also important to take cognizance of the fact that this security architecture 
methodology covers the needs of enterprises that engage in net-centric activities, which 
rely heavily on the information technology.  
The Top-level Goals for the Security Architecture and its methodology are; 
Reliability: The security architecture must be reliable and stable over time. 
Critical success factor and requirement for this goal is enabling the security services to be 
reliable, stable and evolvable over time. 
Integratability: The security architecture must be consistent with current and 
future needs of a security.  
Scalability and Extensibility: The security architecture must enable 
implementations that are scalable and extensible. 
Team Goals: The security architecture should meet the needs of the user 
community. Critical success factor and requirement for this goal include; it should be 
reliable, stable and evolve over time and it should be consistent and coherent 
Management and Provisioning: The standard reference security architecture 
should provide for manageable, accountable environment for security. Critical success 
factor and requirement for this goal should be to enable the management and 
provisioning for security. 
3.2.3. Critical Success Factors for Security Architecture Methodology.  The 
list below shows the critical success factors needed for security architecture 
methodology. 
(1) It should provide guidelines for security policy & standards. 
(2) It should provide guidelines for security management. 
(3) It should provide risk assessment and management. 
(4) Account for security services. 
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(5) It should include security federation. 
(6) Provide for security auditing. 
 
3.3. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
Security requirements identify types and levels of protection necessary for 
equipment, data, information, applications, and facilities. Below are identified some key 
requirements that must be met for a secure system. These requirements apply to a large 
extent to information technology security, although it also applies to other environments 
that require security. The objectives of security requirement are; 
• Ensure that users and client applications are identified and that their identities are 
properly verified. 
• Ensure that users and client applications can only access data and services for 
which they have been properly authorized. 
• Detect attempted intrusions by unauthorized persons and client applications. 
• Ensure that unauthorized malicious programs (e.g., viruses) do not infect the 
application or component. 
• Ensure that communications and data are not intentionally corrupted. 
• Ensure that parties to interactions with the application or component cannot later 
repudiate those interactions. 
• Ensure that confidential communications and data are kept private. 
• Enable security personnel to audit the status and usage of the security 
mechanisms. 
• Ensure that applications and centers survive attack, possibly in degraded mode. 
• Ensure that centers and their components and personnel are protected against 
destruction, damage, theft, or surreptitious replacement (e.g., due to vandalism, 
sabotage, or terrorism). 
• Ensure that system maintenance does not unintentionally disrupt the security 







Figure 3.2:  Conceptual Enterprise Security Architecture. Adapted from [14] 
 
 
3.3.1. Security Policy and Standards.  Security policy refers to organizational 
guidelines and principles that govern the system’s design, operation, and run time. The 
security policy describes what is permissible in a system as well as what the system 
cannot permit. Security standards should be prescriptive guidance for designing and 
operating systems, and should be backed by reusable services wherever practical. 
Security should not be regarded exclusively as an intermediary, but requires an 
architecture and design advocate and backing at runtime.  
Security policy and standards are not end goals in themselves, they need to be 
backed by a governance model (federation) that ensures they are in use, and that it is 
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this means that the security architecture must define reusable security services that allow 
developers to not be security experts yet still build a secure system. 
A security policy should not determine how a business operates; the nature of the 
business should dictate the policy. Defining a company's security policy can seem 
difficult, but by defining policy before choosing security methods, organizations can 
avoid having to redesign security methodologies after they are implemented.  
Security policies should map to an organization's business objectives, regulatory 
issues and industry best practices enhancing their ability to implement strong information 
security and avoid legal and regulatory liabilities. Security experts should work closely 
with each organization to determine their unique business needs objectives, environments 
and cultures. In addition, expertise and thorough understanding of current and future 
regulatory, industry trends and globally accepted standards should be crafted into a policy 
as it becomes available; this will lead to greater security, regulatory compliance and 
enhanced business practices. Features of a balanced security policy are listed below. 
• Provides a comprehensive set of protection criteria based on the availability, 
confidentiality and integrity requirements of the organization, in other words a 
course of action should be provided. 
• Defines roles and responsibilities appropriate to an organization in support of the 
protection policy developed, in other words a guiding principle based on 
corporate policy.  
• Access to market-leading risk management and industry-best practices expertise. 
• Assists an organization in protection policy implementation, acceptance and 
awareness. 
• Builds an enterprise policy framework that is manageable today and in the future. 
• Procedures that are considered expedient, prudent, advantageous, and productive 
Benefits of a security policy 
(a) Fast availability of a customized security policy. 
(b) Provides an objective, expert assessment of current security policies. 
(c) Provides the basis for establishing a security awareness program. 
(d) Supports consensus building for security policy implementation. 
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(e) Ensures compliance with security regulations and limits access to confidential 
data. 
(f) Lowers insurance premiums by reducing risks associated with adverse 
security issues. 
3.3.1.1 Effective security policies. Effective security policies should consider the 
factors discussed in the following sections.  
1. Identifying Resources 
Clearly identifying organizations resources will focus attention to potential 
adversaries who might want to undermine the organization, therefore organizations must 
know what they want to protect, what access is needed, and how these consideration 
work together. Security measures usually do not prevent unauthorized users from trying 
to break security systems; they can only make it more difficult, therefore companies 
should make a decision on what to focus on, the value of their assets or otherwise.  
2. Cost Implications 
Some security measures might inevitably diminish expediency, particularly for 
advanced users. This might lead to the delay of work and may create costly overheads. 
When instituting security policies, companies should weigh cost against the potential 
benefits. Depending on the cost-benefit analysis, some infrastructures might be left 
unprotected, if they do not have costly implications when compromised. 
3. Identifying Assumptions 
Making assumptions provides a starting point when designing a policy. For 
example, an organization might assume that any user is savvy enough to break any 
security code if they are dedicated. It is important to examine and justify assumptions; 
any hidden assumption is a potential security hole.  
4. Controlling Secrets 
Passwords and encryption keys should be kept secrets. Most importantly, areas to 
be protected need to be kept secret. Knowledge with which an organization’s security can 
be circumvented should be guarded carefully to ensure that adversaries don’t get their 
hands on it. The more secrets there are, the harder it will be to keep all of them. Security 
systems should be designed so that only a limited number of secrets need to be kept.  
5. Appreciate the Environment 
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It is important to comprehend the functions of the system in the environment and 
understand how each unit contributes to the system. This will help in identifying 
abnormal behaviors and enable the setting of the proper security policy. 
6. Physical Security 
While logical security is important, physically securing an organization’s 
resources is equally important. Security policy on who is granted physical access to any 
resources should be emphasized. 
7. Providing Pervasive Security 
When changes are made to the system, the security policy should be upgraded to 
encompass the change. This is especially true when new services are created. System 
administrators, programmers, and users should consider the security implications of every 
change they make. Understanding the security implications of a change takes practice; it 
requires lateral thinking and a willingness to explore every way that a service could 
potentially be manipulated. The goal of good security design and policy is to create an 
environment that is not susceptible to every minor change.  
Security policies are living documents, because organizations are constantly 
subject to change, security policies must be systematically updated to reflect new 
business directions, technological changes, and resource allocations.  
3.3.1.2 Methodology for prescribing security policy and standards.  One 
approach to setting security policies and procedures is suggested by the following steps: 
(a) Identify all the assets that need to be protected. 
(b) Identify all the vulnerabilities and threats and the likelihood of the threats   
occurring. 
(c) Look at what policy is currently available; if none exist develop one by 
gathering information from various sources and applying it specifically to 
organizational needs          
(c) Decide which measures which will protect the assets in a cost-effective 
manner. 
(d) Communicate findings and results to the appropriate parties. 
(e) Upgrade current policy and standards with most recent updates and make sure 
to send   out the people charged with implementation. 
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(f) Implement the policy following the established guidelines. Example obtaining 
user ID, verify user ID etc. 
(g) Monitor and review the process continuously for improvement. 
3.3.2. Security Risk Management.  Any security architecture methodology 
should take into consideration risk management, as an important organizing concept. 
Risk is comprised of assets, threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures. A risk 
management centric approach allows for the security architecture to be agile in 
responding to security needs. Risk is a function of threats exploiting vulnerabilities 
against assets. The threats and vulnerabilities may be mitigated by deploying 
countermeasures. The risk management process implements risk assessment to ensure the 
systems’ risk exposure is in line with risk tolerance goals. This does not mean that 
behavior is uniformly risk averse or risk seeking. The system should take on the 
appropriate level of risk based on the set goals.  
By building in risk management, any security risk that is breeched can be 
undertaken by designing and deploying countermeasures that allow for sensible security 
risk.  
Risk management does not eliminate risks entirely, however its’ role in the 
security architecture is  to educate people about the risks they are taking and provide 
countermeasures in the event that the undertaken risk does not suit the defined goals. 
The dynamics encountered by organizations require that organizations sometimes 
have to make decision on whether to embark on vulnerability-based or risk-based 
approaches to security management. A risk-based approach has become the norm, which 
features cost prominently, thereby allowing proper cost associations to be placed on 








Figure 3.3: Risk Equation 
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Risk-based approaches have been used successfully in diverse areas such as 
marine operations, building construction, financing and engineering to improve various 
odds. Uncertainty is the main characteristics of risk.  
The ability to utilize risk management successfully lies in the practical solutions 
for dealing with this uncertainty. Documentations showing reduction in negative risks 
that is attributed to the application of risk management abounds. 
The emergence of risk management in the last fifty years as an interdisciplinary 
field of study known as decision science is aimed at a formalized method to improve risk 
reduction. This analytical approach which was initially applied to aircraft safety and 
nuclear power has rapidly spread to other applications.  
Risk management is a continuous process that assesses/mitigates risks. 
Assessment is activity of identifying and analyzing risk. Probability (or likelihood) is 
chance that risk will occur. Consequence is unfavorable result of risk. Mitigation is action 
taken to lower probability and/or consequence of risk. Risk Level is numerical or 
qualitative assessment of risk based on risk’s occurring probability and consequence. 
Risk management constitute an iterative process involving five important step, 
which are planning, identification, assessment, analysis and handling. 
Several risk assessment methods exists, such as the R. von Solms’ [28] traditional 
assessment vs. baseline control and the quantitative vs. qualitative bifurcation, all have 
pros and cons. The Sandia report [22] discusses risk assessment method that is divided 
into three archetypical approaches identified as “temporal”, “functional”, and 
“comparative”, corresponding to stress testing, threat analysis and lifestyle, respectively. 
However, in this paper attack trees was chosen in order to approach risk 
assessment as a risk-based rather than as vulnerability-based. 
3.3.2.1 Risk analysis utilizing attack trees.  Risk analysis is a method used in 
determining ways to in which risk can be eliminated or minimized. Possible solutions are 
accomplished by utilizing trade-off studies and other analytical methods. 
The term security really does not have a lot of meaning unless it is feasible to 
determine how long security needs to be provided or who to provide security for. A good 
method of going about securing a system is to model security threats against it. This 
method provides insight and understanding to the diverse ways in which a system can be 
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attacked, so that countermeasures can be designed to foil those attacks.  Also 
understanding the means, motivations, and objectives of the attackers will go a long way 
in helping to design better countermeasures to foil attempts by the attackers. 
3.3.2.2 Attack trees and GSN.  Attack trees [29] present a method for evaluating 
the security of systems. They provide a method for the capture and reuse of the expertise 
gained in security, and the ability to respond to changes in security. Since security is a 
continuous process, attack trees provide a basis of understanding that process. 
Attack trees make use of the Boolean logic to determine what needs to happen 
before an attack on a node can occur, originating from one node and propagating through 
the other nodes in the system. This is represented using a tree structure; with the goal 
designated as the root node and the diverse methods of getting to the goal being 
designated as the leaf nodes. The combination of attack trees and Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN) [29] technique provides better safety assurance for a system. 
GSN is used in safety-critical industries to improve the structure, rigor, and 
precision of safety arguments [29].  Figure 3.4 overleaf shows the combination of the two 
techniques. It basically consists of three levels, the top most level is the Goal, the next is 
the Strategy and the last level is the Solution. The Strategy level usually has sub goals. 
From the structure it can be deduced that each level is successively decomposed 
into the next level until a point is reached where nodes can be supported by direct 
reference to available solutions [30]. The argument in diagram above can be summed up 
with the “IF’ statement below.  
 
IF {(Solution 1 OR Solution 2) OR/AND (Solution 1 AND Solution 2 AND Solution 3)] 
} THEN Top Goal 
In employing the attack tree model, value/cost is placed on each node. Another 
method could be rating the vulnerability of each node. In the GSN attack tree [30] model, 
each node is rated based on the risk assessment determined using a scale of one through 
five where 1 corresponds to very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, and 5 = very high. 
Analysis of the risk factor known as the Value At Risk (VAR), decisions on the 
procedure to be undertaken can be made depending on the vulnerability. 
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In determining the VAR, the attacker’s motive plays an important role, since it 
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Figure 3.4: Structure of an Attack Tree using GSN 
 
 
3.3.2.3 Countermeasures, traceability and recovery mechanisms.  In order to 
deploy countermeasures on a compromised system, the security policy (which should be 
robust and resilient) which has been developed for the system needs to be applied.  
An Assurance Case arguing the security of critical system attributes contributes 
significantly towards evaluating the VAR [31]. The NERC homepage has the guidelines 
and best practices in detail, for developing an acceptable security policy [32]. 
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When and if an attack occurs, it is important to trace its source so that proper 
measures can be deployed to counter such attacks in the future. The VAR should be set 
higher if a trace is not possible due to its seriousness. 
A prompt assessment of any damage to the system should be done and recovery 
preformed using the damage recovery technique provided. Also the VAR on the 
compromised node should be set to a lower value. 
3.3.2.4 Methodology for prescribing security risk management. The itemized 
below describes steps necessary to provide for security risk management. 
(a) Identify risks 
 (b) Analyze risks 
 (c) Prioritize risks 
 (d) Define avoidance and alternate for each risk 
 (e) Define mitigation plan 
 (f) Define contingency plan 
 (g) Implement plan, track risk and revise risk management strategy. 
3.3.3. Security Auditing.  Auditing which usually means to formally conduct an 
examination of vital components of an organization sometimes brings to memory images 
of unending witch hunting in some organizations. However conducting an audit enables 
an organization to take a second look at what they are doing thereby enabling them to 
make better decisions.  
Security audits are assessments of how the confidentiality, availability and 
integrity of an organization's system are assured. Conducting a security audit is one of the 
superb methods of determining whether an organization's security measures are effective 
or not without incurring the cost and other associated damages of a security incident.  
Security auditing specifies the extent to which a business, application, component, 
or center shall enable security personnel to audit the status and use of its security 
mechanisms. 
Security audit is also a systematic, measurable technical assessment of how the 
organization's security policy is employed at a specific site. It involves providing 
independent evaluations of an organization’s policies, procedures, standards, measures, 
and practices for safeguarding any information both electronic and otherwise from loss, 
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damage, unintended disclosure, or denial of availability. The broadest scope of work 
includes the assessment of general and application controls. 
Security auditors work with the full knowledge of the organization, at times with 
considerable inside information, in order to understand the resources to be audited. 
Security auditors work by conducting personal interviews, vulnerability scans, 
examination of the organization’s system settings, analyses of networks, and historical 
data.  
Security audits are part of an on-going process of defining and maintaining 
effective security policies. It should involve constant iteration using the feedback derived 
from the processes. It involves everyone who uses any security related resources 
throughout the organization. Security audits provide the tool that enables a fair and 
measurable way to examine how secure a site really is.  
The current state of technology requires audit steps that relate to testing controls 
of access paths resulting from the connectivity of local-area networks, wide-area 
networks, intranet, Internet, etc., in the IT environment.  
3.3.3.1 Objectives of security auditing.  Typical objectives of security auditing 
are to ensure the collection, analyzing, and reporting of information about the: 
• Status (e.g., enabled vs. disabled, updated versions) of its security mechanisms. 
• Use of its security mechanisms (e.g., access and modification by security 
personnel). 
An example of security auditing is an application that can collect, organize, 
summarize, and regularly report the status of its security mechanisms Identification, 
Authentication, Authorization, Immunity, Privacy, and Intrusion Detection. Security 
mechanism for security auditing should be implemented using mechanisms like audit 
trails and event logs. 
The results of these evaluations are generally directed to the organization’s 
management, legislative bodies, or other auditors. Information security auditing may be 
performed in engagements where 
• The specific audit objective is to evaluate security, or 
• The audit objectives are much broader, but evaluating security is a necessary 
subset. (For example, an audit objective such as financial statement assurance or 
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program evaluation frequently may be met only when there is assurance that the 
security of the financial or program data is adequate.) 
3.3.3.2 Methodology for prescribing security auditing.  The itemized below 
describes steps necessary to provide for security auditing.    
(a) Congregate an audit team from the accounts and IT departments. 
(b) Define the scope of audit by creating assets list and security perimeter. 
(c) Create a threat list, examine threat history and check security trends & past     
audits. (d) Review current policies. (e) Perform a survey of the site. (f) Use 
questionnaires where necessary. (g) Develop audit plan/checklist. 
(h) Meet with site managers to determine what data will be collected, how/when  
will it be collected, site employee involvement, and answer questions 
(i) Report findings and update security policy. 
3.3.4. Security Domain Federation.  Network security environments consist of 
dissimilar or diverse constituents. The political concept of "federation" takes on new 
meaning due to these diverse constituents. The arrangement in which no one group or 
organization manages all users and resources in a distributed application environment is 
describes as federation. In this scenario, administrators in diverse domains enact local 
security policies that support the mutual benefits of transactions among their respective 
area of operation.  
The word federation originates from the Latin word trust hence its tie to the trust 
domain. In distributed network services, federation refers to the need for trust agreements 
among decentralized security and policy domains.  
Federation allows access-management functions to span sundry organizations, 
business units, sites, platforms, products and applications. Federation necessitates that an 
organization trust other site administrators to validate its own users' identities. A 
federated environment, allows users to log on and access resources transparently in 
external domains that are subject to various policies defined by both internal and external 
administrators. 
Users can log on through authentication techniques either through an ID/password 
or Kerberos, and this authentication is communicated to a federated destination site 
through an authentication assertion. Kerberos is a computer network authentication 
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protocol, which allows individuals communicating over an insecure network to prove 
their identity to one another in a secure manner. It requires a trusted third party. 
Federation provides the mechanisms for cooperation between different 
interworking network domains possibly owned by different administrators. In order to be 
able to offer services to their users, these administrators must cooperate.  
Security federation specifically refers to an approach that requires a centralized 
focus on security issues. Federated security enables collaboration across multiple 
systems, networks, and organizations in different trust realms. It is a mechanism that 
allows for clean separation between a service and its associated authentication and 
authorization procedures for clients consuming the service. Three key elements of 
federated security architecture are: 
Domain/Realm: This can be a single unit of security administration or trust. A 
typical domain might include a single organization. 
Federation: A collection of domains that have established trust. The level of trust 
may vary, but typically includes authentication and almost always includes authorization. 
A typical federation might include a number of organizations that have established trust 
for shared access to a set of resources. 
Security Token Service: A Web service that issues security tokens; that is, makes 
assertions based on evidence that it trusts, to whoever trusts it. This forms the basis of 
trust brokering between domains. The Figure 3.5 below illustrates an example of 
federated security. 
In this scenario, there are two organizations: A and B. Organization B has a Web 
resource (a Web service), that is of some value to users in organization A.  
3.3.4.1 Trust domain.  Trust is important both in people’s daily lives and in 
networks, because it gives peace of mind to the system administrator that unauthorized 
users can be kept away. Quoting Sen. Chuck Hagel, R-Neb., “... We govern with one 
currency, and that's trust. And that trust is all important. And when you lose or debase 
that currency, then you can't govern……….." 
Interoperability and connectivity needs of equipment in a net-centric environment 
raise trust issues, and trust management becomes pertinent. Trust is essential in 
distributed and net-centric systems because of the need to allow resource sharing, 
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concurrent processing and operations. Communications in these systems traverse 
domains and organizations, and same trust level differ for each of the domains. Yet, 
within the same domain, users’ trustworthiness can diverge. 
Parties involved in the trust include but not limited to the different services of the 




Figure 3.5: Trust Relationship between Two Organizations. 
 
 
currently rely or intends to rely on networked environment enhanced by advances in 
information technology.  
Various dictionaries define trust as an assured or firm reliance on character, 
integrity, ability, strength or truthfulness of a person or something. Another definition of 
trust is the belief that an entity is capable of acting reliably, dependably and securely in a 
particular case. [33]. 
Trust management on the other hand is a “unified approach to specifying and 
interpreting security policies, credentials, and relationships that allows direct 
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authorization of security-critical actions.” [34]. Trust management is the collecting of all 
the necessary information used in establishing trust in a relationship, while continuing in 
the monitoring and adjustment of existing trust relationships[35].  
A flexible and general-purpose trust management system can help maintain 
current and consistent credibility information for the different entities in a net-centric 
system. 
A trust management system unites the concept of security policy specification 
with the method for specifying security credentials. Credentials describe specific 
delegations of trust. Trust management credentials relate directly to authorizations to 
perform specific tasks. Trust management systems support delegation, and policy 
specification and refinement at the different layers of a policy hierarchy, thereby 
implementing consistency and scalability. In addition, trust-management systems are by 
design extensible and can express policies for different types of applications. 
The trust management approach, initiated by Blaze et al. [34] requires that “the 
set C of credentials prove that the request r complies with the local security policy P”. 
Each entity that receives requests must have a policy that serves as the ultimate source of 
authority in the local environment. The policy may directly authorize certain actions to be 
taken, but more typically it will delegate this responsibility to credential issuers that it is 
certain to have the required domain expertise as well as relationships with potential 
requesters.  
The trust-management engine is a separate system component that takes (r, C, P) 
as input, outputs a decision about whether compliance with policy has been proven, and 
may also output some additional information about how to proceed if it has not been met. 
Proofs of compliance can be determined by the use of a general purpose, 
application-independent algorithm which is an important part of a trust-management 
approach. This is a good idea since any product or service that requires some form of 
proof that compliance with policies has been met could use a special purpose algorithm 
implemented from scratch. The advantage of using a general-purpose compliance 
regulator lay in its soundness and reliability of both the definition and the implementation 
of “proof of compliance.”  
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A compliance regulator of a general-purpose nature can be explained, formalized, 
proven correct, and implemented in a standard package, and answers returned for any 
given input (r,C, P) depends only on the input and not on any implicit policy decisions  in 
the design or implementation of the compliance regulator. However, in order to design 
this sort of a trust-management engine some ground rules need to be provided. They are: 
– A definition of “proof of compliance”  
 – Policies and credentials should be fully defined  
–Responsibility should be assigned between the trust-management engine and the 
calling application. For example the application may obtain all credentials needed for the 
compliance proof before the trust management engine is invoked, or the trust-
management engine may obtain additional credentials while it is still constructing a 
proof. 
Distributed systems imply that the systems are located at different places possibly 
in time and space. It is a collection of independent computers/systems that appears to its 
users as a single coherent system. In order for these systems to work together they need 
to communicate through the use of networking resources. Because they are not physically 
accessible, there has to be some way of verifying that indeed it is the right equipment 
when they try to make contact with other distributed systems, therefore the need for trust 
models. 
 Need for Trust Management 
The list below [35] describes the reasons for trust requirements for security in a 
distributed system. 
Authentication: The identity of users in a distributed system is often not well 
known. Hence the need for some form of authentication to be performed before the 
decision to grant access can be made. On average, authentication is achieved through a 
username/password mechanism. Straightforward password-based protocols are 
insufficient in networked computing environments, however, even against 
unsophisticated adversaries; simple eavesdropping can destroy security. Other 
mechanisms include: 
• One-Time passwords, which do not secure the rest of the session. 
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• Centralized ticket-based systems, such as Kerberos [36]. Problems with such 
systems include the necessity for an authentication server (and for frequent 
communication with it) and implicit trust assumptions. 
• Public-key based authentication protocols, which are considered the “state of the 
art” for scalable authentication systems. 
Delegation: Scalability in distributed system is dependent on delegation. It 
enables decentralization of administrative tasks. Existing distributed-system security 
mechanisms usually delegate directly to a “certified entity.” In such systems, policy (or 
authorizations) may only be specified at the last step in the delegation chain (the entity 
enforcing policy). The implication is that high-level administrative authorities cannot 
directly specify overall security policy; rather, all they can do is “certify” lower-level 
authorities. This authorization structure leads easily to inconsistencies among locally-
specified sub-policies. 
Local trust policy: The number of administrative entities in a distributed system 
can be quite large. Each of these entities may have a different trust model for different 
users and other entities. For example, system A may trust system B to authenticate its 
users correctly, but not system C; on the other hand, system B may trust system C. It 
follows that the security mechanism should enforce uniform and implicit policies and 
trust relations. 
A trust model for distributed systems can be illustrated using various trust models, 
such as public key cryptography, the resurrecting duckling model, and the distributed 
trust model. These models will be briefly discussed and its relationship to security will be 
explored. 
3.3.4.2 Trust models.  Below are some trust models used currently in peer-to-
peer systems and other networks. 
Public Key Cryptography or Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) was one of 
the early standards proposed for distributed trust management. It implicitly utilizes trust 
management concept by identifying and authenticating parties seeking to establish 
contact.  
Resurrecting duckling model is a hierarchical structure with a master-slave 
relationship. The mother duck is described as the master entity while the duckling is the 
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slave entity. Instruction or the secret key is passed from the master entity through a secret 
channel to the slave entity.  A slave entity can in turn become a master entity when it 
passes a secret key called imprinting to another entity. 
Distributed trust model is based on “conditional transitivity of trust” [33] which 
simply put means that trust is transitive under some condition. [37] This model relates to 
the human society where trust is generated by both direct and indirect interactions. That 
is, entities can obtain information and recommendations from other sources other than the 
main source. However because recommendations have uncertainty or risk, entities need 
to know how to cope.  
 Two types of distributed trust model exist based on asymmetry; they are direct 
trust and recommender trust. Trust relationship is grouped between the two entities in 
terms of different interactions. Trust in one group does not depend on trust in the other 
group. The model utilizes continuous trust values for direct trust and recommender trust, 
depicted in the tables shown below.   
 
 
Table 3.1.  Direct Trust Value  
 
 
Value Meaning Explanation 
-1 Distrust Completely untrustworthy 
0 Ignorance Can't decide 
1 Minimal Lowest trust 
 2 Average Mean trustworthiness 
3 Good Trusted by major population 
4 Complete Fully trustworthy 
 
Table 3.2. Recommender Trust Value 
 Value Meaning Explanation 
-1 Distrust Completely untrustworthy 





The entity itself judges the 




 The recommendation protocol is straightforward. For example, entity A needs a 
service from entity D (say joint coalition force). Now, A knows nothing about the 
trustworthiness of D’s service, so A asks B for a recommendation with respect to the 
possibility of  joint coalition in the near future, assuming  A trusts B’s recommendation 
within this category. When B receives this request and finds that it doesn’t know D 
either, B forwards A’s request to C, which has D’s trustworthiness information within 
joint operations. C sends a reply to A with D’s trust value. The path A _ B _ C _ D is said 
to be the recommendation path. 
The following formula is used to calculate the trust value from the returned 
value1: tv_T = [rtv(1)/4] _ [rtv(2)/4] _ ... _ [rtv(i)/4] _ ... _ [rtv(n)/4] ? tv(T), where rtv(i) 
is the trust value of the ith recommender in the recommendation path, tv(T) is the trust 
value of target T returned by the last recommender, and tv_T is the calculated trust value 
of target T. When multiple recommendation paths exist between the requester and the 
target, the target’s eventual trust value is the average of the values calculated from 
different paths. 
This model exhibits some weaknesses discussed below: 
• The model does not consider false recommendations and assumes that a 
recommender with a good recommender trust value always makes reliable 
recommendations, which might not be true. 
• The model does not provide a mechanism for monitoring and reevaluating trust, 
which is dynamic. 
Binary concept of true or false should not be used in trust management since trust 
is relative. Abdul-Rahman and Hailes[37] quantify trust as a multiple value concept. 
Several other trust management systems apply similar method. To curtail the possibility 
of the wrong trust recommendations, the trust model is grouped in two 
• Evidence-based model, here entities create trust relationships based on some 
previous evidence, such as keys [38] [39] [40]; 
• Recommendation-based model, here recommendations from intermediaries 
establish the trust relationship between two strangers. Trust management systems 
for distributed systems can be placed into these two categories.  
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3.3.4.3 Recommendation-based trust management.  The previously mentioned 
study conducted by Xiong and Liu on trust management in distributed peer-to-peer 
systems was based on feedback or recommendations of unknown or unfamiliar peers. 
While P2P systems involves entities that may not know each other from Adam, they 
entities that will use the JTA most likely know each other but may not have worked 
tighter. Thus, a slight twist to the equation for this study. However, the recommendation-
based trust model can be applied to this study when some of entities involved may have 
worked together previously. 
Xiong and Liu define a satisfactory interaction as 1 and a complaint as 0 in their 


















• P is a set of entities in the system; 
• u and v are entities in the system, u, v _ P; 
• S(u,v,t) is the degree of satisfaction that u has with v until the tth transaction; 
• T(u,t) is u’s trust value evaluated by other entities until the tth transaction; 
• Cr(v,t) is the balance factor for filtering feedback from v; and 
• I(u,v,t) is the number of interactions that u has with v up to the tth transaction. 
Therefore, T(u,t) is the ratio of the cumulative weighted satisfaction that u 
receives to the total number of interactions that u has within the system. 
S(u,v,t) _ Cr(v,t) by I(u,v,t) – C(u,v,t) _T(v,t). C(u,v,t) is an approximation which 
shows the degree of complaint filed by v against u. and C(u,v,t) _ T(v,t) indicates the 


















 T(u,t) falls within the range of (0, 1) as prescribed by Xiong and Liu . The higher 
T(u,t) is, the more trustworthy u is. This approach uses v’s trust value T(v,t) as a balance 
factor. The higher T(v,t) is, the more reliable v’s complaint is. Thus v’s complaint has 
more impact on u’s trust value. The trustworthiness decision criterion is: 
If I(u,t) > C1 and T(u,t) > C2, then u is trustworthy. 
C1 and C2 are thresholds, with C1 defining the minimum number of interactions 
required. Obviously, a certain number of interactions are necessary to improve accuracy. 
Xiong and Liu’s approach considered both positive and negative evaluations and 
interaction history, and therefore more likely to produce accurate results. Some drawback 
associated with this trust management system is explained below: 
• A minimum number of interactions are required in equation two’s decision 
criteria, therefore a possible disadvantage for an entity which has not worked with 
any one of the group in the system. 
• Equation one uses a  balance factor which is a trust value assigned by one the 
entities the system assumes that an entity with a higher trust value always gives 
more reliable feedback than an entity with a lower trust value, which might not be 
true. 
• There may come a time when the entity’s behavior may change due to prevailing 
circumstance. The most recent feedback will be closer to the entity’s current 
behavior than older feedback; however this model utilized same weight in 
evaluating an entity’s trust.  
A similar trust management system utilizes feedback to evaluate trust value; 
however, it only considers complaints making the system too sensitive to misbehavior. 
Decision is made by using probabilistic method to analyze complaints.  
Security policy and standards normally dictates standards that all equipment 
interacting with its’ system should adopt. This can be translated as a sign to promote trust 
among genuine systems wishing to utilize the capabilities of a system in a networked 






3.3.5. Security Management.  [27] Relates that managing security is one of the 
many problems that confronts organizations and must be resolved in order for its mission 
to be accomplished. Regardless of the assets that need securing—information or technical 
assets, physical plant, or personnel—a security strategy that can be deployed, measured, 
and modified as becomes necessary is a must have for the organization. The effectiveness 
of any security strategy depends on how well it fits with the CSFs as well as the 
organizations’ other missions. 
When problems traverse an organization, it poses many management challenges, 
especially when it concerns security. First and foremost the areas of import should be 
identified and targeted. This requires the organization to take an inventory to determine 
what needs to be protected and why. In a large, complex organization, this can result in 
the identification of hundreds of assets that are important to strategic drivers. Next, in 
order to secure these assets special skills and resources will be required, typically 
scattered throughout the organization. Because security is a concern for the whole 
organization, its’ management is no longer seen as a sole proprietary of information 
technology department.  
Security issues are becoming increasingly complex, and the need for a single, 
centralized point of management is becoming increasingly necessary. As the threat in the 
environment grows, compliance issues are making it essential to secure an ever-
increasing perimeter. 
A centralized philosophy of management needs to be adopted, backed by a robust 
security infrastructure with immediate Event Management responsiveness, and backed by 
Information Management long-term configuration and log analysis support. 
Security management is further discussed by looking at two equally important 
subfunctions, security services and security processes. 
3.3.5.1 Security services.  Security services provide confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability services for a   platform. Security services are implemented as protection 
services, such as authentication and authorization, detection services, such as monitoring 
and auditing, and response services, such as incident response and forensics. These 
services have served as the goals and objectives for information security programs for 
many years, but they do not provide an actionable blueprint as such. Later on in this 
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document, a method to map these security services into an overall security architecture 
plan will be described. 
Security services can also be described as those services that support access 
control on objects and non-repudiation of operations on objects. Access control is defined 
as a Security service that gives admittance to a user. Non-repudiation, which is also a 
security service, provides proof that an action was carried out by a particular user at a 
particular time. 
3.3.5.2 Security services and strengths required.  The security services and 
strengths required for network protection are discussed below. 
Authentication: Authentication of all personnel in this domain is required. 
Access Control: Access to data objects in this domain shall be granted on an 
individual basis. Access control shall restrict functions available for all data sets on 
example documents. Individuals filing research documents shall have read access only to 
data sets pertaining to pending actions. Government personnel processing the documents 
shall have read access to all data sets in this domain and read/write access to their 
assigned documents. 
Data Integrity: Data integrity shall be provided for all information within the 
domain. 
Confidentiality: Not mandatory for document filings but the capability is required 
as a choice should the filer so require. Required for all document processing done by the 
Government after receipt. 
Non-Repudiation: Not required for document filing but the capability is required 
as a choice. Required for all Government initiated actions pertaining to pending 
document actions. Individuals must be positively identified and time stamping for 
electronic document filing actions is required. 
Audit: All access to the systems within the domain to modify data objects shall be 
audited. 
Availability: Since DOCT is a research and development system, specific 






Various attributes are needed to support policy-based decisions. These attributes 
are those of the principals, the system resources, and the application environment. This 
service group provides standard access mechanisms for such attributes, and defines how 
attribute queries are returned.  
Principal Attribute Service – provides query and retrieval interfaces to access 
attributes for principals, which may be individuals or even organizations. The attribute 
taxonomy or “schema” is not defined by the service, but rather by the underlying attribute 
authorities (e.g. identity stores). These attributes are retrieved and provided upon request 
and may be used as inputs to the policy decision logic  
Other attribute services are Resource Attribute Service for retrieving resources, 
Environment Attribute Service for retrieving environment attributes and Attribute 
Administration services to actively manage the attributes.  
Credential Services 
Credential service provides identification and recommendation that enables 
subscribers participate in electronic transactions. It provides access to the underlying 
security infrastructure. If a credential service provider offers more than one type of 
credential then each one is considered a separate credential service. Some of the services 
included in credential service include: 
• Certificate Validation Service (CVS) – CVS makes it possible for clients to assign 
part or all certificate validation responsibilities. This is particularly important for 
clients who do not have the capability for Public Key Processing (PKI). 
• Certificate Registration Service – Public Key certificates are necessary to utilize 
digital signatures and encryption. Assuming that clients generate their own 
public/private key pair, their equivalent certificates need to be generated, hence 
the need for a certificate registration service. This services the required protocol 
that enables the use of the public/primary key system. 
• Certificate Retrieval Service (CRS) – CRS helps provides authentication 
verification, digital signature verification, and public key encryption operations 
for users and clients alike. 
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3.3.5.3 Security process.  Risk management, security policy and standards, and 
security architecture govern the security processes and defense in depth architecture 
through design guidance, runtime support, and assurance services. Security metrics are 
used for decision support for risk management, security policy and standards, and 
security architecture. The security architecture should have a reference implementation 
for developers and other IT staff to review what functions the security mechanisms 
performs, and how they do it. 
Security processes carry out the intent of the system risk management, security 
policy and standards, and security architecture. They are broken into discrete domains 
because they solve very different problems, and require different staffing, support 
models, and success criteria. 
 
3.4. OVERARCHING METHODOLOGY FOR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE  
(1) Create security policy & standards by  
(a) Identify all the assets that need to be protected. 
(b) Identify all the vulnerabilities and threats and the likelihood of the 
threats occurring. 
(c) Look at what is currently available; if none exist develop one gathering 
information from various sources and applying it specifically to 
organizational needs          
(c) Decide which measures which will protect the assets in a cost-effective 
manner. 
(d) Communicate findings and results to the appropriate parties. 
(e) Upgrade current policy and standards with most recent updates and 
make sure to send   out the people charged with implementation. 
(f) Implement the policy following the established guidelines. Example 
obtaining user ID, verify user ID etc. 
(g) Monitoring and review the process continuously for improvement. 
 (h) Adopt technical standards where necessary 
(i) Ensure that users comply by providing access to information on ways 
to procure and install/implement. 
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(2) Establish security federation for the organization by 
  (a) Designing trust models 
  (b)Devise procedures for establishing trust. 
(3) Establish a risk management approach including  
(a) Identify risks (b) Analyze risks (c) Prioritize risks (d) Define avoidance  
and an alternate for each risk (e) Define mitigation plan (f) Define 
contingency plan (g) Implement plan (h) Track risk (i) Revise risk 
management 
(4) Incorporate security auditing process 
(5) Security management process is necessary to ensure that all the security 
services and processes are co-coordinated properly. 
 Figure 3.6 below depicts the methodology diagram consisting of the five elements 





Figure 3.6:  Security Architecture Methodology Process. 
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4. THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-ROLLA SYSTEM 
The University of Missouri-Rolla (UMR) is one of four campuses in the 
University of Missouri System. The university is a research school that offers educational 
programs in major engineering and other scientific disciplines that are technology-based, 
technology-dependent, or which support these programs. UMR has a student population 
of over 5000 each semester in about 2,160,199 gross sq.ft. acreage. Classes are held at the 
main campus in Rolla and at several off campus locations. Also the advances afforded by 
information technology have made it possible for students to enroll and attend classes 
virtually from all parts of the globe; nearly 100 classes are taught via distance education 
in each of the fall and spring semesters. This trend has ensured that UMR is among the 
higher education institutions with net-centric capability. This, in turn, has presented the 
UMR IT department some challenges, one of which is designing a security architecture 
for its net-centric system. 
There is no one single solution for a security architecture for a net-centric 
capability in a higher education institution such as UMR, but using the common elements 
of security architecture for NEC developed in the previous sections, a suitable plan of 
action can be developed for UMR. This security architecture needs to be reviewed 
periodically and updated as needed or as a result of security audit reports. 
 
4.1. CHALLENGES FACED BY UMR IT SECURITY 
Universities and other higher education institutions such as UMR have networks 
that are frequently open, to facilitate collaboration between students, faculties and 
research organizations that are not on the campus. This also means that computers from 
off campus sites which connect to the university’s network might already be 
compromised,  making it a lot easier for viruses, worms, and other malicious software to 
spread throughout the network. Therefore both outside (off campus) and inside (on-
campus) threat issues will need to be considered. 
Also open networks which allow computers outside the campus to connect to the 
campus networks are more susceptible to hackers than computers in corporate networks 
as depicted by a test at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County (UMBC) and 
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similar test at other universities which show that security can be compromised in a matter 
of hours. T This is because the open, collaborative network environments at universities 
are seen as easy targets by the hackers [41]. 
Another challenge is that UMR has over 6500 students and faculty, who may have 
little or no training in good system administration practices, each possibly using 
individual computers/laptops.  
Because IT infrastructures are constantly evolving, it therefore means that a 
security architecture can never be complete and will need revising at intervals. On the 
other hand, this constant change can be advantageous since it may present opportunities 
to leverage new technologies. 
Viruses are written to achieve the most possible damage and reach the widest 
possible audience; in most institutions, Microsoft operating system and Microsoft 
software suite are used, therefore devising a security architecture that puts focus on this 
will be of immense advantage. 
 
4.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The problem faced by UMR can be viewed from two perspectives: network 
protection and information protection. As stated in the challenges above, a major problem 
for UMR is how best to secure the information in an open network. How best to assure 
users that the information going through the network is secure without infringing on the 
rights and expectations for an open network. Another requirement of similar importance 
is how to protect the network from attacks that might cripple the network. 
In order to tackle this problem, a first step is to assess the mission statement, 
which includes both the use policy and the e-mail policy.  
 
4.3. REASONS TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
(1) Information Protection: to assure that the information on students, staff, and 
faculty is not accessed by unauthorized persons. 
(2) Intellectual Property:  to ensure that only authorized students/faculty/staff can 
access course materials. 
(3) Integrity:  to ensure the integrity of data stored in accounts. 
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(4) Access Control:  To protect computers inside the perimeter protected by 
traditional firewalls. 
 
4.4. CURRENT SECURITY APPROACH AT UMR 
Currently, there is no specific approach or single document utilized by UMR, 
rather the security policy and activities are scattered throughout different areas. One 
example of a security approach in place is to give several privilege levels to students and 
others. Subsequent paragraphs compares UMR security architecture with the five security 
architecture elements developed in this thesis. 
UMR appears to have three levels of policy and standards: an IT policy, a UMR 
policy and an overarching UM System policy.  The policy and standards are good first 
steps; however, they can and should be improved.  One very positive step that UMR has 
taken over the past few years is the appointment of a full-time Information Security 
Officer.  There is also an IT Coordination Committee which reviews progress and 
policies. 
UMR IT performs a qualitative risk assessment by performing a daily threat 
analysis. They also use an Educause tool, which is vulnerability analysis software for 
residual risk examination. They have seen a 10%-19% increase in improvement in their 
ability to detect threat. 
UMR IT does not use external auditors to audit the network; rather they keep a 
main log and monitor accounts periodically.  The entire University of Missouri System 
conducted an internal audit several years ago which led to more consistent policies across 
all four campuses.  At UMR, students accounts are usually left for 6-12 months after the 
students graduate; employee accounts are frozen immediately upon leaving UMR and all 
privileged are revoked. 
For federation, they rely wholly on recommendation-based trust in allowing 
network users access. There is a plan in the works to use shibboleth in the future for a 
federated identity based authentication and authorization. Shibboleth will allow for 
information about users in one security domain to be provided to other organizations in a 
common federation, which will provide cross-domain single sign-on identification 
(SSID) and will remove the need for content providers to maintain usernames and 
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passwords/passphrases. Identity providers supply user information, while service 
providers consume this information and gate access to secure content. 
In the management area, UMR has a business impact analysis assessment process 
which consists of business continuity and disaster recovery techniques, recovery time 
objectives, reliability goals, multiple feeds to pick up slack time (that is, the utilize 
redundancy so that no time is lost in the event of a recovery) and assets recovery (which 
is not yet available).  
 
4.5. USERS OF THE NETWORK 
There are diverse usages of the UMR network and users’ privileges vary. Some 
users have only a basic privilege, while others have very high level privileges. The 
network use by student ranges from entertainment to research; therefore they are given 
the basic of privileges. 
The next usage level is for educational use by faculty and research professionals 
and they have a higher level privilege. There are research users whose privilege ranges 
from low to extremely critical. There is also business usage by administrators within the 
UM System office; they have high to critical privilege. The network is also used for 
distance education where there are several privilege ranges. There are also staff users. 
There are external users of the network, one of which is the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS). USGS uses it for rapid access mapping for rescue operations. 
All these users require different trust and privilege levels. 
 
4.6. IDENTIFYING RESOURCES TO PROTECT 
Human Resources Office: This office collects and maintains information on all 
persons employed by the university, including their social security number which can 
easily be used by identity thieves to ruin a person’s credit. Therefore protection of all 
computers in this office is a must and should reside at a high level. 
Accounts Department: This office is equally important because it keeps records of 
all account information of students. If a computer in this office is compromised it can 
make it impossible to determine who has paid fees and who has not. 
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Email Server: Emails are so prolific today that younger generations must wander 
how older generations thrived without it. Likewise its usage on campus are enormous. 
Users are entitled some degree of assurance that their emails are sent only to the intended 
party and nowhere else. 
Research Computers: Research is the bedrock of most institutions and successful 
research is critical to institutions such as UMR. Therefore it is important that research 
computers are not compromised whether to destroy or steal information and intellectual 
property. 
Other Computers: Other computers in the system also need to be protected since 
some of them can log in to some of the other mentioned computers. 
Network: The network is the conduit through which all these computers 
communicate. Constant monitoring of the network is necessary to locate lapses and 
intruders and to identify malicious activity of insiders within the network. 
 
4.7. IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
There are five elements of a security architecture as developed in this thesis; 
therefore the focus is on the elements of most importance for UMR with its open 
network. It is important to note that all five elements are necessary for successful security 
architecture; however some elements will be stressed more than others. Given the 
resources identified above as deserving protection, the categories into which they fall are 
examined closely, starting with security risk management and ending with security policy 
& standards. 
4.7.1. Security Risk Management.  Security risk management is important as 
already highlighted, more so for an open network such as ones found in UMR. Therefore 
more work can be done in this area in order to ensure the integrity of the network. Using 
the attack tree methodology as described in this thesis would enable and promote a 
rigorous security risk management plan for UMR network. 
4.7.2. Security Audits.  Even though logs are maintained and accounts monitored 
periodically, there is a need for an external auditor who will provide an objective 
approach different from what is obtained internally. External auditors can provide 
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unbiased audits that will enable the discovery of vulnerabilities that may lead to the 
revision of the security policy and standards. 
4.7.3. Security Federation.  The future use of the shibboleth system and any 
other trust model will surely be beneficial to the UMR network. The use of the network 
by the USGS might raise the trust level; therefore, in addition to the recommendation-
based trust; the use of other trust models mentioned in this thesis will be needed in order 
to have a good grasp of the federation required. 
4.7.4. Security Management: Security Services & Security Process.  The 
UMR IT Office already utilizes various techniques in security management, one of which 
is the assignment of various privilege levels to categories of users. In the future, as they 
implement the shibboleth program, there will be a need for attribute and credential 
services. There will also be a need to improve access control to restrict access to some 
network sites by the anticipated users from other colleges and institutions. In addition, a 
documentation of the procedure on Event Management responsiveness, backed by 
Information Management long-term configuration and log analysis support, will go a 
long way in providing a starting point for security officers in the future.  
4.7.5.  Security Policy and Standards.  The security policy’s hierarchy is thus 
UM System: UMR: IT [42]. These policies and procedures are quite extensive. As more 
improvements are made to the network, it will to be updated, especially after audits are 
completed. 
 
4.8. OVERARCHING METHODOLOGY 
• Gather information about network security strategy, technology, policy, and 
devices 
• Analyze network security architecture and design 
• Identify, confirm, and reduce vulnerabilities in network security architecture, 
devices, and features 
• Document security risk analysis and provide recommendations 
• Provide an onsite presentation of findings and prioritized recommendations. 
• Revise security policy and standard where needed. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This research proposed a security architecture for network enabled systems using 
five elements and further prescribed a security architecture methodology by leveraging 
these five elements. The security architecture while similar to [14] draws from several 
sources with an added methodology for developing each element. Using mathematical 
analysis and heuristics as tools, each element was further developed to show approaches 
of describing them. The challenges of prescribing a security architecture for net-centric 
systems were enumerated and discussed at length. The relevance of developing a security 
methodology for large scale net-centric operations, despite the obstacles, can be deduced 
since society has come to rely on such networks for daily activities and more. 
An overview of system architecture was presented to show conceptually where a 
security architecture resides in relation to systems architecting and architecture in 
general. Also security architecture requirements for net-centric system were offered. The 
methodology began by carefully performing critical success factors analysis bearing in 
mind the goals of the proposed security architecture methodology.  
Furthermore, the five elements of security architectures, namely Security Policy 
& Standards, Security Risk Management, Security Auditing, Security Federation and 
Security Management of services and process, were individually elaborated and 
developed by presenting mathematical analysis where applicable and methodologies were 
in turn prescribed. An overarching methodology was aggregated and put forward. 
The methodology can be scaled to size for smaller net-centric operations such as 
UMR, by focusing on the important elements. Because of the open nature of an 
educational institution’s networks, focus can be shifted to the elements of most 
importance or where a security breach is most likely to occur.  
Following the methodology developed, the current security architecture at UMR 
was presented and recommendations given for the future. 
Future work in this area would be to implement this security architecture by 
following the procedures demonstrated in this thesis, as well as upgrading this 
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